Disappointing and Troubling Behavior
The Biden Administration Rebukes Allies for Following Its Lead
Ned Price, the State Department spokesman, has been rebuking Middle Eastern allies lately. In the grand sweep of diplomatic history, the rebukes are minor episodes, but they nevertheless reveal a major truth about the Middle Eastern policy of the Biden administration.
On March 10, Price sharply criticized the United Arab Emirates (UAE) for inviting Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad for a visit. The UAE’s reception of Assad marked the first time that an Arab state had hosted the dictator since the outbreak of the Syrian civil war. Assad is Iran’s closest ally, and the UAE’s reception of him was part of a larger move to improve relations with Tehran. After welcoming the Syrian dictator warmly, the crown prince said, “Syria is a fundamental pillar of Arab security, and that the UAE is keen to strengthen cooperation with it.”
The United States, however, was not pleased—or so it said. “We are profoundly disappointed and troubled by this apparent attempt to legitimize Bashar al-Assad, who remains responsible and accountable for the death and suffering of countless Syrians,” a statement from Ned Price read. Two weeks later, Price scolded a second Middle Eastern ally—and for a similar reason. The ally was Qatar, and the infraction was inviting military representatives from Iran, including members of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) to a defense exhibition in Doha. In rebuking the Qataris, Price drew on the same language he had deployed against the Emirates. The United States is “deeply disappointed and troubled,” he said.
But the statement was thoroughly disingenuous. If it had been sincere, then the Biden administration would be deeply or even profoundly disappointed and troubled by its own behavior, starting with its reported willingness to consider removing the IRGC from the State Department’s list of foreign terrorist organizations. “We are very concerned about the United States’ intention to give in to Iran’s outrageous demand and remove the IRGC from the list of terrorist organizations,” Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett said at a recent cabinet meeting.
Bennett had good reason to be outraged, but the willingness to consider de-listing the IRGC is not the main reason why. The Israelis are witnessing a region-wide shift in the balance of power in favor of Iran—a shift of which the Emirati and Qatari embrace of Iran and Syria is part. The cause of the shift is the decision of the Biden administration to return to the Iran nuclear deal. Not only does the deal put an international stamp of approval on Iran’s military nuclear program, but it also channels tens of billions of dollars to Iran’s coffers in the short term, hundreds of billions over the next decade. The IRGC’s power will increase exponentially, and the Assad regime will benefit substantially from its success.
In fact, thanks to the solicitude of Washington, the rise of Iran is already well underway. In order to signal goodwill to Tehran, the Biden administration has turned a blind eye to Iranian oil sales that violate American sanctions, thus funneling considerable revenue to Tehran. Meanwhile, in the Vienna negotiations over the resurrection of the nuclear deal, the Iranians refused to sit down directly with the American envoy, Rob Malley, insisting instead that intermediaries (Russian, European, and Chinese) shuttle between him and his Iranian counterpart. By accepting this snub and continuing to pursue an accommodation of Iran, the Biden administration signaled to its allies in the Middle East that Washington would allow itself to be treated by Iran as a subordinate power.
As if to drive the point home, the American military has remained largely supine over the last year as Iran has repeatedly used its proxies or its own forces to subject Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Israel, and Iraq to attacks from drones and ballistic missiles. On at least one occasion, an Iranian-backed group in Iraq conducted a direct attack on American forces—in al-Tanf, Syria. These provocations neither triggered a meaningful American military countermeasure nor prompted the White House to consider breaking off the negotiations in Vienna.
Consequently, the deterrent power of the United States eroded significantly. No one feels the consequences of this erosion more acutely than Gulf allies. Those who have been on the receiving end of Iranian attacks, such as the Emiratis, seek ways to remove themselves from the target list. And those who have never been attacked, such as the Qataris, seek ways to stay off the list permanently. The UAE and Qatar are not large enough, and their militaries are not powerful enough, to deter Iran by themselves. Therefore, Biden’s courtship of Iran gives them no choice but to appease the IRGC. If the White House truly expects the allies to take a harder line, it must start by taking a harder line itself.
Does Ned Price not understand this elementary dynamic? What Price learned or didn’t learn in International Relations 101 is anybody’s guess, but there is no need to plumb the depths of his personal education to understand why he rebuked the UAE and Qatar. These rebukes were a simple communications trick—one he learned in his previous government job.
Price started his career in the Central Intelligence Agency—an unusual starting point for a State Department spokesman. In the Obama administration, he moved to the White House, where he served as the deputy to Ben Rhodes, Obama’s deputy national security advisor for strategic communications. Rhodes was the primary architect of the Echo Chamber, the network of governmental and non-governmental organizations, that the White House knitted together to promote the Iran nuclear deal. Indeed, it was Rhodes who, in an ill-considered interview in The New York Times Magazine, gave the Echo Chamber its name. In addition, he all but admitted that the Obama White House injected into the American media half-truths and blatant falsehoods by laundering them through “independent” journalists and policy analysts.
This hot stew of misinformation created the impression that Obama’s policy was a response to a new openness in Tehran. In truth, it was a unilateral American initiative based on progressive dogmas.
It’s safe to assume that Price won his current job as State Department spokesman, because the Biden administration intended, from the moment it took office, to re-sell the Iran nuclear deal to the American public—using the same bag of communications tricks that Obama used. Those include the systematic misrepresentation of American intentions. Price’s rebukes of the Qataris and Emiratis, for example, construct a Potemkin policy—a false front of concern about countering Iran and Syria.
Price talked at the Emiratis and Qataris, but his true audience was the American public. The false front gives senior Biden officials rhetorical tools to bat down obvious criticisms. “How do you respond to critics who claim you are empowering the IRGC by lifting sanctions on Iran?” journalists will ask. “That claim is preposterous,” senior officials will respond. “Our record of standing up to Iran is long and well-documented. Just look at how disappointed and troubled we were when the Emiratis and Qataris tried to normalize with Assad and Iran.”
Ned Price is but one small soldier in a very large army. All senior Biden officials are intensely aware that, the moment the Iran nuclear deal is completed, a torrent of white-hot criticisms will hit them in the face like a blowtorch. From now until the deal is done, they will craft their every statement to deflect from the truth that they are abandoning allies and empowering enemies.
Consider, for example, the performance of Secretary of State Antony Blinken last weekend in Israel. Blinken joined an unprecedented six-way meeting hosted by Israeli Foreign Minister Yair Lapid and attended by top diplomats from Egypt, the UAE, Bahrain, and Morocco. Against the background of growing tensions between Washington and its Middle East allies over the revival of the Iran nuclear deal, the Israelis were eager to stage a spectacle of unity that would impress upon Blinken, quietly and diplomatically, the value of adopting a tougher position against Tehran. “Work with us in unity,” they were signaling, “instead of with the Iranians.”
Blinken played along but pursued an entirely different agenda. “The US will continue to stand up to Iran when it threatens us or when it threatens our allies and partners,” he told the participants. This obvious falsehood insulted the intelligence of the assembled allies, but Blinken was focused on his audience back home. Viewing the event through its television screen, the American public did not see a secretary of state abandoning allies. Instead, it saw Blinken joining hands with friends and pledging his unwavering support to them.
And it also saw allies nodding their heads in appreciation. What choice did they have? The United States remains the most powerful country on earth. If its allies were to embarrass Blinken by revealing that he treats them as props on a television set, they would call down upon themselves the wrath of a superpower. So, instead, they just grin and bear it. Behind the scenes, however, the allies candidly express harsh criticisms. As any recent visitor to the Middle East can attest, the allies find Biden’s courtship of Iran disappointing and troubling—and profoundly so.